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Introduction
Citizenship is a way of defining personhood, which
links rights and agency: ‘citizenship as rights enables
people to act as agents’ (Lister 1997). It is
consequently a powerful word, with connotations of
respect, rights and dignity. As Fraser and Gordon
(1994) remark: ‘We find no pejorative uses. It is a
weighty, monumental, humanist word’. However,
the history of citizenship has been one of terrible
exclusions, stemming from the denial of respect,
rights, dignity and even humanity by some groups to
others. Indeed, from its earliest inception, citizenship
has been as much about exclusion as inclusion.
This article explores these simultaneous processes of
inclusion and exclusion as they have occurred in
different places and at different times in order to
understand better the vision of society, the material
interests and the notions of identity, which have
helped to delineate different understandings of the
concept. This is no easy task. Even a preliminary
reading of the vast literature on citizenship, spanning
the experiences of ancient Athens, the Roman
Empire, medieval Europe, the advanced industrialised
countries, colonial and post-colonial states, makes it
clear that while the idea of citizenship is now nearly
universal, ideas about citizenship are not, and never
have been.
The aim of this article is to contribute to the
development of a research agenda on the theme of
‘inclusive citizenship’. While it will touch briefly on
the history of the concept, and its practice in
different places and times, the main substance of the
article is concerned with some of the challenges it
presents in the context of poorer Southern countries
today. A preliminary clarification on the use of the
term ‘citizenship’ here is necessary. Conventionally,
citizenship has been traced to the rise of the nation
state and taken to refer to membership of the nation
state and the formal duties and rights which
membership carries (Shapiro 2000). This
understanding has been contested by those who
point out that such membership may mean little to
its members in contexts compared with other forms
of affiliation with which they identify.
However, here, the concern is with this formal
notion of citizenship, in order to investigate the
extent to which it meshes with, contradicts, or is
marginal to other forms of membership that may
matter more. The concept of ‘inclusive’ citizenship is
taken to refer both to people’s ability to claim their
legally recognised rights on an equal basis as well as
to the extent to which that law deals with them in a
way that guarantees their equality. Forms of
exclusion and violations of rights which occur in the
context of movements, or attempted movements, by
people between nation states, is an important topic
in its own right and will not be touched on here.
Citizenship and exclusion: a historical
perspective
From Athens to the Enlightenment: changing
notions of citizenship
In its earliest incarnation in the ancient city–state of
Athens, the concept of citizenship implied a
‘community of equals’. However, the community in
question was a highly bounded one. Only those men
with the material means, personal breeding and
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leisure to perform their civic duties counted as
citizens. Excluded were women and slaves whose
domestic labours freed citizens to participate in
public life. Citizenship in medieval Europe was also
highly selective, confined to residents of the city
who had freed themselves from feudal relations of
servitude. Outside the city, feudal relationships,
based on ‘private-law’ identities such as serf, villein,
vassal, lord and so on, continued to govern social life
(Walzer 1989).
The ideas of the Enlightenment with its assertion of
free will and individual conscience brought modern
ideas about citizenship into existence. The French
Revolution remains the most potent symbol of the
struggle to establish a notion of citizenship based on
civil and political rights against the claims of the
feudal order. Citizenship was to be ‘the dominant
identity of every Frenchman against the alternative
identities of religion, estate, family and region … [and]
replace religious faith and familial loyalty as the central
motive of virtuous conduct’ (Walzer 1989: 211).
While the Enlightenment provided the ideas which
fuelled the struggle for citizenship, the dissolution of
the older feudal order in the course of
industrialisation and the rise of capitalism provided
the material conditions under which it was finally
won. In Britain, citizenship rights, initially limited to
the nobility in their relations with the monarch,
were gradually extended to new groups, first of all,
the rising propertied middle class, and later to the
rest of the adult male population.
As Marshall points out, the concept of citizenship
was also made more inclusive through a broadening
of the rights of the citizen to include social rights.
While membership of village communities, towns
and guilds had offered some degree of social security
in the pre-industrial period, this had been eroded by
the spread of capitalist market relations. However,
the diminution of inequality, which accompanied the
growing prosperity of the entire society and the
compression of the economic distance between
classes led to a growing demand for an abolition of
inequality, at least with regard to the essentials of
social welfare (Marshall 1950: 107).
While Marshall’s analysis of the evolution of ideas
about citizenship remains one of the most insightful
and widely cited, it has also been recognised as
partial and incomplete, even in the context he is
dealing with. The ‘history of citizenship’ he describes
is, almost exclusively, that of the white, male
working class in industrialising Britain. It is an account
of a society without empire and without internal
inequalities, save those of class (Fraser and Gordon
1994: 93). It is silent on gender and race and on the
rights of those whose lands were colonised, whose
way of life was disrupted and whose humanity
denigrated by the imperial powers, including, of
course, Britain.
A somewhat different account of rights and
citizenship emerges in the context of the USA.
While exclusion in the European context had been
justified on the basis of the inherited feudal privilege,
citizenship in America was guaranteed by a
constitution which drew on the ideas of the social
contract theorists, including that of the natural rights
of ‘the people’. Exclusion could therefore not be
treated as a taken-for-granted aspect of the social
order; it had to be actively justified through the
ascription of various forms of deficiency. When
working class men were initially denied the status of
citizen, it was on the basis of a presumed association
between ‘prudence, probity and possessions’. Those
without property, it was held, had no stake in the
common good.
Justifications for exclusion took on a more
primordial form when they were bound up with
socially ascribed identities, such as those of race and
gender: ‘nature had made women so weak as to
require male protection and blacks so stunted that
slavery was their true condition’ (Shklar 1991: 49). The
denial of the vote to the black population on the
basis of lesser intrinsic worth continued even after
the abolition of slavery. While the 15th Amendment
to the American constitution finally extended the
suffrage to black men, a variety of ‘unruly practices’,
including ‘grotesque registration requirements,
literacy tests, poll taxes, grandfather clauses, white
primaries, and more chicanery than they could
possibly defeat’ (Shklar 1991: 55), served to subvert
their political rights in the South for several decades
thereafter.
Women, black as well as white, continued to be
denied civil and political rights long after the
franchise had been extended to black men. The
common law of coverture meant that married
women did not exist legally as independent
individuals, but were placed under the ‘cover’ of their
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husbands who, as head of household, represented
them in the public domain. As a result, women could
not own property or make contracts without their
husbands’ consent and were denied free access to
education and employment and custody over their
children. It was not until the mid- to late nineteenth
century that women began to enjoy some measure
of civil rights and not until the twentieth century
that they were given the franchise.
Citizenship and empire
The other telling silence in Marshall’s account of
citizenship in Britain is on the rights of the colonised,
an ironical omission in an era when Britain was the
leading imperial power. Relationships between
different imperial powers and their colonised
subjects had obvious differences but also remarkable
similarities. Mamdani’s explanation for this is to the
point: 
... the colonial state was in every instance a
historical formation. Yet its structure everywhere
came to share certain fundamental features …
because everywhere the organisation and
reorganisation of the colonial state was a
response to a central and overriding question: the
native question. Briefly put, how can a tiny and
foreign minority rule over an indigenous majority?
(Mamdani 1996: 16).
The colonial powers drew on a variety of sources,
including their experiences and those of others.
Hailey’s discussion of a system of law for colonial
Africa, for instance, draws on the experiences of
imperial Rome as well as of the British in India: 
Expressed in the briefest of terms, the chief
problem of Rome was one of assimilation, and in
this respect the Latin mind tended to regard
identity of legal rights as a more important
element than the equality of political powers. The
problem of the British in India was primarily to
find a system of law which would avoid
emphasising the fact that the country was passing
under the domination of a Power professing an
alien faith (cited in Mamdani 1996: 49).
It was, in the end, indirect rule, ‘association, rather
than assimilation’, that became the hallmark of
colonial rule. Even the French who began by
granting citizenship to the inhabitants of their
colonies soon found that native cultural assimilation
led to ‘a resurgence, rather than a subordination’, of
native political demands. They soon learnt the value
of ‘association’. However, as Mamdani points out, it
was the British who were first to realise the
‘authoritarian possibilities in indigenous culture’ for
attaining hegemonic domination of their subjects
(Mamdani 1996). They constructed the colonial edifice
on pre-existing arrangements, institutions and
identities, but in ways which promoted their goal of
hegemony (Bose and Jalal 1998). Customary law and
traditional authority may have been invoked to
support the hierarchical ordering of society, but the
customs and traditions in question were largely
‘invented’ ones, re-interpretations and reifications
which served the imperial project. The history of
colonial strategies in both India and Africa is
testimony to this strategy.
Prior to colonialism, both regions appear to have
been characterised by considerable heterogeneity in
economies and cultures, and matching assortments
of political arrangements. In the absence of a central
state, authority was dispersed within the community
and legitimated by customs of caste, clan, kinship and
so on. The colonial endeavour, in each region, was to
codify, and in the process, to re-interpret and reify,
customs and practices which had hitherto been fluid,
shifting and capable of accommodating a diversity of
local circumstances and needs. In each, the effect
was to set up separate ‘communities’, each governed
by its own customs and traditions, alongside a civil
society, with a modicum of civil rights, in which
selected representatives of the colonised groups
interacted on unequal terms with the representatives
of the colonial powers. In each context, political
power was absorbed into the centralised state
apparatus of colonial rule that replaced the diffuse
and diversified political arrangements that had
existed previously.
In the Indian context, the British were able to use
various classification and codification practices to
construct economic, religious and caste categories,
which then became the basis on which they
distributed differential patronage. The privatisation of
land through the Permanent Settlement Act created
a powerful landlord class, loyal to British interests. In
addition, British scholars and officials, with the aid of
native ‘experts’, set about codifying the religious
‘laws’ of the different communities to provide the
basis for governing their personal lives. These
personal laws referred to those principles and
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practices which governed relationships within the
private sphere of the family, covering such matters as
marriage, divorce, maintenance, guardianship of
children, adoption, succession and inheritance. They
were seen as specific to, and separate for, different
religious communities.
However, the process of codification relied on the
interpretations of a small privileged group within
each religion, Koranic and Brahmanaical priests,
scholars and clerics, who not only often disagreed
with each other, but whose interpretations bore
little relationship to the far more fluid and syncretic
practices which had prevailed in local communities
beyond the reach of the Mughal court (Bose and
Jalal 1998; Mukhopadhyay 1998). In other words,
‘[w]hat British judges recognised as authentic was
“sastric” law in the case of Hindus and interpretation
by a cadi in the case of Muslims’ (Menon 1998).
The adoption of religious law in the personal sphere
was intended to placate conservative opinion within
the different religious communities, and win their
support for the colonial rulers. The British also
adopted the principle of granting separate
electorates to ‘majority’ and ‘minority’ religious
communities in both local and provincial bodies. The
effect of this was to solidify divisions along religious
grounds, and to unify groups who were
geographically and culturally dispersed, but shared a
common religion.
Caste was the other major category that became
politicised during colonial rule. In principle, Hinduism
acknowledges four main castes. In practice, these are
subdivided across the subcontinent into many
thousands of sub-castes. The lowest rung of the
ladder within each local hierarchy is occupied by the
untouchables, considered outside the caste system,
and associated with the most stigmatised occupations
within their societies. Just as the census enumerators
had helped to establish the existence of supra-local
categories organised along religious grounds, so the
enumeration process also helped to construct a
supra-local ‘depressed’ or ‘exterior’ caste category.
This had enormous implications, carving out an
ideological space within which hitherto
geographically scattered and culturally differentiated
groups could be constituted as a legitimate social
category on the basis of their shared subordinate
status. ‘... it was then a matter of political concession
rather than ideological imagination to treat them as
entitled to the kind of advantages bestowed on
other groupings’ (Mendelsohn and Vicziany 1998). The
politicisation of this ascribed identity became evident
in the demands of ‘untouchable’ leaders that they be
treated as a social minority comparable to the
Muslims and provided with reserved seats in
legislative bodies.
By giving differences within the population far greater
significance than they might have warranted, and
constructing artificial and unstable unities, British
authorities sought to pre-empt the possibility of a
unified resistance to their rule. These differentiated
categories became the basis on which political claims
were made and recognised. When the British
conceded first nominated, and later elected,
representation by Indians to local legislative councils,
the basis of representation was that of ‘group’, rather
than ‘individual’ interests, initially of the landlord
classes and later of religious and caste communities.
And when the Indian National Congress fought for
independence, ‘liberty was understood not as an
individual right, but as a nation’s collective right to
self-determination’ (Khilnani 1998).
The same divisive strategies were also in evidence in
the very different context of sub-Saharan Africa.
Indeed, the earlier experience in India served to
shape colonial rule in Africa:
European rule in Africa came to be defined by a
single-minded and overriding emphasis on the
customary. For in the development of a colonial
customary law, India was really a half-way house.
Whereas in India, the core of customary law was
limited to matters of personal law, in Africa it was
stretched to include land ... Just as matters like
marriage and inheritance were said to be
customarily governed, so procuring basic
sustenance required getting customary access to
communal land ... With this development, there
was to be no exit for the African from the world
of the customary (Mamdani 1996: 50).
One reason for this brief digression into the colonial
construction of ‘community’ is that, however
‘imagined’, the boundaries that were constructed,
and however ‘invented’ the customs and traditions
that defined them, these became ‘real’ in the course
of time. They were assimilated into the world-views
of their members and became the basis on which
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they acted politically. And they continue to shape
state–citizen relationships in the post-colonial era.
The materiality of citizenship
The materiality of citizenship: the Western
experience
This rather truncated and selective history of
citizenship has been provided partly in order to
understand what it means, and how it came about,
but also to make the point that the diverse ways in
which citizenship is thought about and practised in
different times and different places are critically
bound up with prevailing material realities and
associated ideas about personhood. In this section,
the focus is more specifically on these aspects in
order to consider in very broad terms how they help
to influence contemporary patterns of inclusion and
exclusion. For the purposes of this analysis, the
article is limited to a somewhat stylised
representation of these differences through a
contrast of ‘Western’ and post-colonial experiences.
The idea of citizenship as a way of defining the place
of the individual in society evolved in the Western
context as part of a series of changes which served
to erode earlier definitions.2 In traditional pre-
capitalist societies, claims to resources were generally
grounded in variations of the ‘moral economy’,
which served to keep individual self-interest in check.
Social relationships were characteristically ‘quasi-
permanent’, non-voluntary and hierarchical
arrangements, which required subordinates to obey
and super-ordinates to protect. The disposition of
property and other resources was based on a variety
of relationships, including those of kin. Ownership
tended to be a matter of divided and overlapping
claims to various kinds of access and use, rather than
of clear-cut individual property rights. The extended
notion of family gave a wide range of kinfolk, as well
as neighbours and villagers, some degree of
economic responsibility for each other.
Prevailing notions of personhood reflected these
material realities. ‘Relationally defined statuses were
cast as prior to, or contemporary with individuals and
constitutive of their entitlements and obligations’
(Fraser and Gordon 1994: 96). There was no legal
recognition of ‘individuals’ as bearing rights which
preceded, and were independent of, their place in a
status hierarchy: ‘it was an ontology that had room
for masters and subjects, but no place for citizens’
(Fraser and Gordon 1994). The emergence of the
individual as citizen, a sovereign human being, equal
to all others, subject only to the laws of the land and
the forces of the marketplace, was a product of the
ideas of the Enlightenment, with its focus on
individual consciousness and free will, combined with
the material transformations associated with the
spread of market relations, the dissolution of landed
privilege and the rise of a new, property-owning
middle class. Both sets of changes represented major
challenges to pre-existing notions of personhood.
The privatisation of land, for example, deprived the
rural population of their customary rights of tenancy
and use, but also freed them from customary
obligations, so that they could enter into contracts to
sell their labour in the marketplace. The reform of
traditional poor relief weakened established patterns
of community support, further detaching labour
from the support of kin and community. Civil rights
expanded at the expense of customary claims and
obligations. Whereas previously, all social relations
had been formed from, or modelled on, kinship, such
relationships shrank in the course of industrialisation
until they were confined to, and identified with the
‘private sphere’, the sphere of custom, norm and
sentiment.
Elsewhere in society, the expansion of generalised
commodity exchange, and the emergence of the
modern state, gave rise to an ‘impersonal’ public
sphere, where the laws of the land and the forces of
the marketplace prevailed. Civil society, and the
practice of citizenship, became part of this newly
delineated space where contract had replaced
custom: ‘resources were exchanged for exact
equivalents in discrete, monetised transactions
between self-interested independent individuals’
(Fraser and Gordon 1994).
As the model of the contract gained ascendance
over a progressively larger share of human relations,
the range of socially permissible alternatives gradually
narrowed, so that residual forms of exchange, those
which were neither contractual nor familial,
appeared unilateral and voluntary, entailing neither
entitlement nor responsibility. Classified as charity,
such exchanges positioned the giver as morally
creditable and the recipient as stigmatised. This was
the model of exchange that underpinned the
reformed poor laws, which provided a basic
modicum of social assistance to those in need on
condition they gave up their rights as citizens.
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However, the gradual extension of franchise beyond
the propertied classes also gave rise to demands that
labour should not be treated as simply another
‘commodity’ and that the working man required a
certain basic minimum of social security in order to
exercise the full civil and political rights of citizenship.
Whereas civil–political rights had promoted the
‘negative freedoms’ necessary for the pursuit of
profit untrammelled by the constraints of custom,
tradition and moral economy, a new set of social
rights sought to create the ‘positive freedoms’
necessary for those without property to participate
fully as citizens. These did not rule out inequalities per
se, but they did reduce inequalities in the capacity to
act as citizens.
It should be noted that this version of social rights
largely emerged out of the social democratic
traditions of the European states. As Fraser and
Gordon (1994) point out, the greater individualism
which characterised American culture offered little
space for social rights and the implied obligations of
individuals to contribute to the collective welfare.
Nevertheless, the historical evidence tells us that the
emergence of liberal notions of citizenship, premised
on the model of free and equal citizens, took place in
the context of a series of major material and
ideological upheavals, the ‘great transformation’
described by Polanyi (1944): the decline of feudal
property relations, the rise of capitalist markets and
the modern state, the growing individuation of ideas
of personhood, the real and ideological separation of
the different spheres of society, encapsulated in the
separation of the ‘public’ sphere of market, state and
civil society and the ‘private’ sphere of family, kinship
and community. These transformations were
accompanied by the development of institutional
machineries to uphold the emerging rule of law.
Though discrimination in access to rights, resources
and recognition on the basis of ascribed characteristics
still continues in these countries, the principle of
individual rights and equality before the law is one that
has been firmly established and accepted.
The materiality of citizenship: the post-colonial
experience
The experiences of the colonised countries form a
marked contrast to this scenario. Here the modern
state was founded in the context of colonial rule and
dedicated to its defence and prosperity rather than
to the development of the local economy or social
redistribution. The practice of citizenship by the
colonial powers at home bore very little relationship
to their practice in their colonies. As a result, not
only did they fail to challenge pre-existing hierarchies
based on tradition, custom and ‘moral economy’,
they actively strengthened and reified them through
the defining powers of a modern state apparatus and
a codified system of law. Consequently, colonised
populations achieved national independence
organised as religious, ethnic and tribal communities
with immutable interests and collective rights,
‘apparently eternal and enduring elements of their
societies’, rather than as individual and free citizens.
Although it was hoped that independence would
bring about an expansion in material prosperity and
political freedoms, liberal notions of citizenship were
not part and parcel of the struggle for independence.
As Khilnani (1998) points out, the constitutional right
to universal suffrage did not emerge from popular
pressure within Indian society. It was upheld by a
small intellectual elite who hoped that the different
processes that had unfolded in slow sequence, often
over centuries, in the West, and which had formed
the material conditions for their prosperity and
freedoms could be condensed into a rapid
simultaneity in India (Khilnani 1998: 65).
This did not happen. A modern state and universal
franchise were put in place, but the social and
economic changes that had given rise to these
political institutions in the West occurred only
unevenly. Limited success with industrialisation, the
very gradual spread of market relations, the
continued gulf between urban and rural life, the
incapacity or unwillingness of the state to provide for
the social welfare of the majority of its citizens, and
its capture by powerful elites, all meant many of
these pre-existing social relationships and the
inequalities which they embodied, survived intact, or
only marginally transformed, in the post-
independence era.
The idea of citizenship as rooted in an ontology of
personhood which recognises individuals as bearing
rights which are prior to, and independent of, their
place in status hierarchies, still has only shallow roots
in many of these societies. Relationally defined
statuses continue to be cast as prior to individuals
and hence constitutive of their entitlements and
obligations. Kinship remains a central organising
institution, structuring politics, religion, economy and
social relationships, and rendering the distinction
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between public and private irrelevant. Individuals
continue to be classified in terms of their kinship
roles and relationships and their place within the
community. Where market relations spread, and the
role of the state expanded, kinship may have been
partially displaced from the centre of all social
relationships, but the boundaries between public and
private remained weak and fluid. And where the
state remained weak and socioeconomic rights were
either missing or had little relevance to major
sections of society, kinship and community relations
continued to provide the ‘anchor for security’ for
individuals (Joseph 1997).
This is the situation that continues to prevail in many
post-colonial states. The adoption of certain formal
rights, with neither the commitment to the
obligations which correspond to these rights, or the
institutional machinery which would give them
substance, make such rights formal, rather than real,
and enjoyed with varying degrees of certainty by the
population. The highly partial, incomplete and
fragmented notions of citizenship which result often
serve to reproduce, rather than disrupt, the socially
ascribed statuses of kinship, religion, ethnicity, race,
caste, gender and so on in the public domain.
It may be argued that these differentiated notions of
citizenship resonate more closely with the cultural
contexts in which they occur, than do imported ideas
of universal individual rights. They correspond to the
hierarchies of affiliation which prevail and
acknowledge the implications of diversity and
difference in ways that are likely to be overlooked in
more universalist notions of citizenship. On the other
hand, and less positively, it can also be argued that
differentiated notions of citizenship negate the very
forms of agency that the idea of citizenship was
intended to promote and keep alive the very forms
of inequality it was intended to negate. In the next
section, some of the different ways in which
prevailing ideas about personhood, identity and
affiliation fracture the rights of citizens and lead to
exclusionary outcomes are highlighted. These in turn
suggest themes for research into inclusive citizenship.
Challenging citizenship
Citizenship and political contestation
Attempts to formulate citizenship rights and duties
are fraught with difficulty in any context
characterised by diversity. However, they are
particularly fraught in post-colonial societies in which
pre-existing differences within the population have
been exacerbated or artificially suppressed by the
strategic manoeuvrings of colonial powers. Attempts
to address this problem through differentiated
principles of citizenship which seek to balance local
and national interests, individual and collective rights,
have given rise to their own set of problems in the
form of persisting conflicts of interests and loyalties.
These may take ethnic, religious and other primordial
forms, but they are essentially political conflicts
about the nature and boundaries of citizenship.
In Nigeria, citizenship is associated with a definition
of indigeneity based on lineage. To be born and to
have an entire working life in a particular state does
not qualify an individual as an ‘indigene’ of that state.
Instead, they can only exercise certain citizenship
rights, including election to public office in the
ancestral home state, irrespective of the strength of
ties retained with that home. The principle of
‘autochthony’ ignores the historical process of
integration, inhibits any contemporary tendency
towards integration and creates a situation of
effective dual citizenship in many parts of the
country, regardless of how long, and for how many
generations the individuals may have been resident in
the community to which they are not “indigenous”’
(Mustapha 1997: 216).
In Kenya, contested notions of citizenship illustrate
the twin problems of defining the ‘national interest’
and reconciling it with group interests. For the larger
ethnic groups (the Kikuyu and Luo), a majoritarian
electoral system offers control over the centralised
apparatus of the post-colonial state and new
opportunities for advancement. For the minority
ethnic groups, however, this model of democracy
consigns them to the status of a permanent minority.
Their interests are better served through majimboism
or regionalism, which would decentralise much of
state power to autonomous regions, more or less
ethnically defined, colonial administrative units.
In India, the intensification of majoritarian
democratic politics has seen the erosion of the
secular ideals of the constitution, as a new
generation of actors have entered the political stage
defining themselves explicitly as members of
religious communities. Indeed, as Khilnani points out,
the very success of India’s democracy has
engendered the menace of the tyranny of the
religious majority, a threat traumatically manifested
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by the destruction of the Babri Masjid at Ayodhya by
militant Hindu activists. Conflicts have also occurred
along caste lines. While electoral politics has been
gradually replacing the ‘hierarchy of castes’ with a
‘democracy of castes’ (Kaviraj 2000: 104) in the
political arena at least, upper castes have waged war
on those below them, often engaging in vicious
atrocities on untouchable groups in regions like
Bihar. Populist politics has also given rise to attempts
to continuously extend the principle of affirmative
action, embracing not only the scheduled castes but
also other backward castes and even religious
minorities, until in almost every case, ‘the caste to
which an individual belongs becomes a relevant
factor in determining his entitlements’.
Citizenship and social inequality
A second problem of citizenship stems from
definitions and practices associated with it which
serve to reinforce, rather than eradicate, pre-existing
forms of social inequality. The elevation of religious
family to the status of public law, as in countries like
Lebanon, India, Pakistan and Bangladesh, does not
simply offer women different civil rights from men,
but also, in contexts of religious diversity,
differentiated between women and men from
different religious communities. Moreover, as Joseph
(1997) points out, it permits members of all social
classes, religious and ethnic groups to transport the
identities and affiliations of the private sphere of
family, kinship and community into the public sphere
of state and civil society. These identities and
affiliations, rather than those prescribed by law,
structure social life and public policy, shaping access
to the considerable resources of the state.
Such behaviour reproduces in the ‘public’ sphere,
various forms of inequality which reflect the social
relations of the ‘private’ sphere: ‘the distinction
between ‘elite’ and non-elite kinship networks,
between rich and poor families within the same
kinship networks, between old and young within
these families, and between men and women.
Resources are distributed on the basis of highly
personalised, face-to-face relationships often
grounded in real or idiomatic kinship, thus subsidising
the control of male/elders over familial females/juniors/
‘poorer relatives …’ (Joseph 1997). As a result, citizens
come to expect that demands of kin will take
precedence over civil procedures and that their civic
rights are conditional on the sets of relationships
that they are able to mobilise.
Citizenship and economic dependency
The third challenge to the practice of inclusive
citizenship in poorer countries comes from poverty
itself. In situations of extreme scarcity, the formal
guarantee of rights is likely to be irrelevant, since
seeking redress for the violation of even the most
basic of civil rights entails unaffordable costs.
However, even the act of contemplating seeking
legal redress suggests that a degree of agency has
been exercised. A different set of issues comes into
view in situations where the absence of the basic
survival security impinges so severely on people’s
agency that it undermines not only their ability to
act as citizens, but even the possibility of
contemplating such action. These contexts highlight
not only the indivisibility of different kinds of rights
but also the indivisibility of basic needs and basic
rights.
Where people lack the means to meet their daily
survival needs, they will only achieve security of
livelihoods by binding themselves into highly
asymmetrical relationships, receiving a variety of
resources essential for their basic needs in return for
a variety of resources, which reinforce their patron’s
dominant status: political or factional support, muscle
power in conflict, aid in emergencies, guaranteed
supply of labour in peak periods and so on. To
understand how these economic relationships
impinge on the basic rights of citizens, Smith (1997)
points to the phenomenon of power by ‘anticipated
reaction’.
The threat of withdrawal of support by patron
households influences the behaviour of the
dependent households in ways that are likely to have
implications for their agency as citizens. Such power
exists even where there is not clear evidence of
attempts by the patron to limit the behaviour of
dependent clients. The latter will still feel a pressure
to act in what they believe to be the patron’s
interests rather than their own, including through
their voting behaviour, joining or forming
associations, exercising freedom of expression. By
undercutting the capacity of dependent groups to
influence the processes by which their legitimate
claims gain the status of formal rights and to
participate in the processes by which these formal
rights are made ‘real’, the existence of such
vulnerabilities ‘undercut the development of any kind
of reliable, grounded social practice of respect for
human rights generally’ (Smith 1997: 11).
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Citizenship and cultural devaluation
The final challenge to ‘inclusive’ citizenship relates to
issues of culture and identity. Citizenship is a
particular way of defining personhood that is in
contradistinction to definitions based on status
within hierarchical social relationships. It seeks to
replace claims based on norm, charity, benevolence
or patronage with rights guaranteed by the state. As
we noted in the opening quote, ‘citizenship as rights
enables people to act as agents’ (Lister 1997).
However, the formal recognition of rights is not
sufficient to turn people into agents. We have noted
some of the ‘external’ constraints that prevent
people from realising their rights as citizens. This
section touches on others, which are more ‘internal’
in nature. They relate to the cultural valuations,
including self-valuations, of different groups and
their implications for their ability to act as citizens. As
Lister points out:
... to act as a citizen requires: first a sense of
agency, the belief that one can act; acting as a
citizen, especially collectively, in turn fosters that
sense of agency. Thus agency is not simply about
the capacity to choose and act but also about a
conscious capacity which is important to the
individual’s self-identity (Lister 1997: 38).
In other words, to claim one’s rights, there has to
be a prior belief in one’s right to have rights (Isin and
Wood 1999).
Citizenship and identity are thus intrinsically
connected. Historical evidence tells us that when the
rights of certain groups are routinely overlooked or
violated and the groups themselves devalued,
disparaged or invisibilised by the society in which
they live, the denial of recognition can help to
reinforce a lack of agency on their part. The
importance of this mechanism was articulated over a
century ago by Frederick Douglass in his arguments
for the enfranchisement of black men in the USA:
‘Men are so constituted that they derive their
conviction of their own possibilities largely from the
estimate formed of them by others. If nothing is
expected of a people, that people will find it difficult
to contradict that expectation …’ (Frederick
Douglass, cit. Shklar 1991: 56).
As Elizabeth Cady Stanton put it, ‘To deny political
equality is to rob the ostracised of self-respect; of
credit in the marketplace; of recompense in the
world; of voice in (the choice) of those who make
and administer the law; a choice in the jury before
which they are tried, and in the judge who decides
their punishment (cit. Shklar 1991: 59). And as Shklar
added, ‘Not to be heard is not to exist, to have no
visibility and no place politically’ (ibid).
Socially hierarchical relationships, and the inequality
of claims, entitlements and personhood which they
embody, can be reproduced without a great deal of
effort on the part of dominant groups if their
dominance goes unquestioned. Unlike the strategic
silence on the part of subordinate groups discussed
in the previous section, the silence here reflects the
absence of questions. The stirrings of a willingness to
contest their devalued status on the part of
subordinate groups marks the beginnings of their
journey from subject to citizen.
Towards inclusive citizenship: an agenda for
research
This article has offered a broad-brush sketch of some
of the factors behind the failure of ‘inclusive’
citizenship in the specific contexts of the South. It
makes clear that the constructing of more inclusive
forms of citizenship is not amenable to the ‘quick-fix’
of policy recommendations. It is likely to entail forms
of change that go beyond the domain of policy
analysis and touch on changes in individual identity
and consciousness, as well as protests, movements
and prolonged struggles. For the purposes of using
research as a means of understanding how these
changes are likely to occur, a number of themes
emerge out of the analysis in this article.
z Institutions and access. The state, in its various
manifestations, is clearly central in determining
which needs and priorities are given the status of
rights and in their operationalisation. However,
beyond the state, a wider range of institutions,
including those of the market and civil society,
also contribute to the process through their
recognition and respect for these rights. Although
these are all in principle neutral arenas, in practice
they tend to mirror and reproduce the social
inequalities which prevail in a given context. This
can occur through active discrimination or
through unconscious biases. The result is that
those that are marginalised within the wider
society are also least likely to gain access on equal
terms to the rights, resources and protection
associated with the status of citizenship. A study
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1 With thanks to Joanna Howard, Alex Shankland,
John Gaventa and Phil Dufty.
2 This account draws largely on Fraser and Gordon
(1994).
of the processes by which institutions responsible
for both civil–political rights (courts, police,
judiciary, political systems) and economic–social
rights (state delivery systems, corporate entities,
trade unions) give rise to patterns of inclusion and
exclusion is clearly critical to an understanding of
the dynamics of exclusionary citizenship.
z Identity and agency. A second important theme
relates to how excluded groups view their
exclusion. How people define themselves, and are
defined by others, is likely to be critical to their
ability to exercise agency on their own behalf,
including the agency needed to challenge their
exclusion. To what extent do these definitions
incorporate the ‘right to have rights’, the critical
precondition for claiming rights? And where such
self-recognition is absent or only weakly present,
how is it brought into existence? Mendelsohn and
Vicziany (1998) attribute an important role to
education in promoting the political agency of
dalits. They believe that access to education made
an important difference at the level of individual
identity: ‘Formally educated people tend to be
different. Education engenders a kind of self-
confidence … to invest a person with a sense of
entitlement to equal treatment in matters of
human concern’ (Mendelsohn and Vicziany 1998:
263). Elsewhere, however, it has been suggested
that formal education reinforces a sense of
devaluation and alienation through the
promulgation of the dominant values of a society.
As Freire has observed in a number of his writings,
liberating forms of education come from acts of
cognition rather than transfers of information. The
various formal and informal, recognised and
invisible, ways that excluded groups acquire
knowledge and information about their status and
rights and the capacity to reflect on their situation,
to question it and act on it constitutes a common
starting point in attempts to challenge exclusion.
z Associations and collective action. Individuals
can, and do, seek to challenge their exclusion
from the status and practice of citizenship, but
where exclusion is deeply entrenched, such action
will have marginal impact. Historically, it is
individuals acting collectively that has made most
progress in redefining the boundaries of
citizenship. Not all forms of group action operate
in the political sphere, or in explicitly political
ways, but they become ‘democratically relevant’
when they seek to contest relations of dominance
in the sphere within which they operate (Ibrahim
1997: 19). Having a say in the way one is ruled is
part of the process by which recognised
procedures for participation and accountability are
established. Where these are not established by
those in authority, they have to be obtained
through struggles ‘from below’. The third theme
suggested by the analysis of this article, is the
study of different forms of associations which
seek to challenge the exclusions of citizenship in
different contexts, the identities and interests
which bind them together, the forms of collective
action they engage in, what they achieve and the
notion of personhood which they embody and
promote.
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